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Abstract
The paradoxical aspect of integration of a social group has been highlighted by Peter
Blau (Exchange and Power in Social Life, Wiley and Sons, 1964). During the integration
process, the group members simultaneously compete for social status and play the role
of the audience. Here we show that when the competition prevails over the desire of
approval, a sharp transition breaks all friendly relations. However, as was described by
Blau, people with high status are inclined to bother more with acceptance of others; this
is achieved by praising others and revealing her/his own weak points. In our model, this
action smooths the transition and improves interpersonal relations.
Keywords: social systems, Heider dynamics, asymmetric relations, jammed states
1. Introduction
More than a half of century ago, Blau described a social phenomenon which he called
“paradox of integration” [1]. According to Blau, an integration of a social group in-
cludes two competing processes: attempts to appear attractive raise both attraction and
repulsion. While the former reaction is natural, the latter comes from the fear of be-
ing dominated. As a paradoxical consequence, most attractive persons can be rejected
by the group. Having this in mind, persons both attractive and smart maintain their
popularity by self-mockery and praising others. Up to our knowledge the effect remains
unnoticed by social modellers, despite its importance as of a collective social phenomenon.
Taking the Blau description as granted, we intend to sharpen the picture of the
paradox by developing its quantitative aspects. There is vast literature about dangers
of quantitative social modeling, provided by both sociologists and modellers themselves
[2, 3, 4]. Taking this into account, we are more attached to the internal logic of the
social phenomenon, provided by the model, than to the calculated values of the model
variables. We believe that the quantitative research should provide scenarios based on
hypothetical “what if” assumptions. Below, attempts to attain higher status at expense
of somebody else will be encoded symbolically as ’critique’, and attempts to reach sym-
pathy – as ’praising’. We are going to consider two versions of the model, without and
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with the self-deprecating strategy. Although we do not expect this strategy to be absent
in real societies, we hope that the counterfactual approach allows to identify its conse-
quences.
According to both scenarios considered here, an agent i praises or critiques another
agent j, loosing or gaining her/his own status, respectively (for simplicity we write on
males from now on). Simultaneously, the status of a praised agent j increases, and the
status of a criticized agent j is reduced. These variations are balanced, however, by the
acceptance of i by the praised agent j, altogether with the acceptance of i by those with
the same status as j. On the contrary, a critique raises hostility towards i of the criticized
agent j as well as of those with the same status as j. In the second scenario, agents adopt
also the self-deprecating strategy. Then, their utility functions depend additionally on
their actual status: if one’s need of high status is already fulfilled, an agent is more prone
to praise others [1]. A reverse of this strategy is the shame-rage spiral [5]; own status
perceived as low is known to trigger aggression.
The goal of this work is to capture the collective character of the phenomenon. Cou-
pling between agents is due to the variations of interpersonal relations, which involve all
agents of the same status as the one who is praised or criticized. (A similar solidarity
has been suggested by assuming that agents of the same size are prone to cooperate
[6].) This group reaction weakens, however, due to a creeping polarization with respect
to status. Social polarization known to be ubiquitous [7, 8]; its relation to our work is
limited to the process of status formation in groups. Yet, even this limited aspect of
the polarization is essential for the formation of group structure, group perception and
identity formation [9, 10]. Although the polarization is not our founding assumption, it
appears as a natural consequence of the modelled dynamics.
In the next section, the algorithm is described in details. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted
to our numerical results and their discussion, respectively. In the last section we note
that the term “paradox of integration” has been used recently in a different meaning,
and we discuss the mutual relation of these two phenomena.
2. Algorithm
In a fully connected network of N nodes, an agent is represented by a node. A social
status Ai is assigned to each agent i; initial values of those variables are small integers,
selected randomly to be zero or ±1. Here, integer representation is chosen for its sim-
plicity. The relations between agents are encoded in the form of an asymmetric matrix
x(i, j) = ±1, with elements +1 (friendly) or −1 (hostile). The matrix element x(i, j)
specifies the relation of i towards j.
In the first scenario, the simpler one out of the two considered here, the evolution
proceeds as follows. At each time step, an ordered pair (i, j) of different agents is selected
randomly. (This means, that we select an agent i and next we select an agent j, with the
probabilities 1/N and 1/(N − 1) respectively, the same for all agents.) The i-th agent
evaluates his utility function f(i, j) if he praises or critiques the j-th agent. To do this,
he needs to know the number v(Aj) of agents with the same status as the j-th agent,
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including j himself. The decision – to praise or to critique – is taken by checking the
sign of f(i, j) given by
f(i, j) = −p+ 1− p
N − 1v(Aj) (1)
Here, p is the weight of the preference of status, and 1− p is the weight of the preference
of acceptance. Once the former prevails, i.e. f(i, j) < 0, the decision is to critique. Then,
x(k, i) is set to be −1 for all agents k such that Ak = Aj . Next, the status Ai is increased
by one and the status Aj is reduced by one; note that the change of status concerns only
two agents. In the opposite case, when f(i, j) > 0, the decision is to praise. Then, all
changes go quite the opposite: x(k, i) is set to be +1 for all agents k such that Ak = Aj ,
next Ai → Ai − 1 and Aj → Aj + 1. In this way, the mean value of the status is kept
constant within the model; each increase of Aj is accompanied by a decrease of Ai, and
the opposite. This makes the status similar to IQ, with its mean value assumed to be
100 for each society. Actually, only relative variations of status are relevant.
The second scenario is all the same; the only modification is that the agents’ deci-
sions include the dependence of the weight p on the actual status of the decision-maker.
As explained above, the mechanism is that p decreases with Ai. Here we redefine the
parameter p as
p′i =
2p
1 + 2Ai
(2)
what keeps p′i < 1 as long as p < 0.5. This function captures both effects: the self-
deprecating strategy and the shame-rage spiral.
3. Results
For both scenarios, we trace the mean value < x > of all relations xij against time t,
averaged also over 100 realizations. This is an indicator of the kind of relations: friendly
(positive) or hostile (negative). Also, keeping in mind that the mean value of the status
remains constant, we are interested in its standard deviation. Initial values of the rela-
tions x(i, j) do not influence the results, as they are forgotten in a few time steps. The
model dynamics describes the process of differentation of status; then it makes sense to
assume a narrow distribution of the initial values of Ai, as we do.
The results on < x > obtained within the first scenario, where the weight p is con-
stant, are shown in Fig. (1). It appears that the behaviour of < x > sharply depends on
the parameter p, and this dependence manifests only after some transient time. There is
a critical value of p, denoted as pc from now on; for p < pc, the mean relation tends to +1,
while for p > pc it goes slowly to negative values. For N = 75, we get pc = 0.013. This
critical value is apparent, when we plot < x > against p after long time of calculations;
such a plot is shown in Fig. (2). Further, the transition point pc is found to depend
on the system size N ; this dependence is shown in Fig. (3) together with the fit to the
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function aN−b. The obtained parameters a, b are both close to unity.
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Figure 1: The mean value of relations < x > against time, for different values of the
parameter p, calculated for the first scenario for N = 75 and averaged over 100 simula-
tions. The line tending to +1 includes the data for four values of p: 0.010, 0.011, 0.012
and 0.013. The remaining plots tend to -1, in the order from upper to lower curves when
p increases from 0.014 to 0.45.
The standard deviation of the status σA is shown in Fig. (4) as a function of time,
for different values of p. As a rule, the standard deviation increases without limits. The
related exponent in the diffusion-like law σ2 ∝ tα, measured after the transient time
t ≈ 105, is close to one. An exception is the range of p between 0.03 and 0.05, where α
is closer to 0.8; we deduce from Fig. (4) that this behaviour is transient. In any case, as
the distribution of A gets wider, the numbers v(A) decrease to one or zero; there is less
and less of cases where there is more than one agent with a given status.
The results obtained within the second scenario are shown in Figs. (5) and (6), on
< x > and σA, respectively. Comparing the results with those in Figs. (1) and (4), we
can identify the consequences of the application of the formula for p′ (Eq. 2). First, as
shown if Fig. (5), the division of the plots < x > (t) into two sets, tending asymptotically
to ±1, is not visible; the dependence of < x > on p after long time of calculations (106
timesteps) remains continuous. On the other hand, although initially the plots for larger
values of p decrease similarly in Figs. (1) and (5), in the second scenario those decreasing
functions turn back towards positive values.
The results shown in Fig. (6) indicate, that in the second scenario the standard devia-
tion σA remains much more limited. Here the difference between the plots for p < pc and
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Figure 2: The mean value of relations < x > against the parameter p, after two different
times of evolution (t = 105 and 106), calculated for the first scenario for N = 75 and
averaged over 100 simulations. The lower curve is for the longer time.
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Figure 3: The transition point pc as dependent on the system size, together with the fit
to the function aN−b.
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Figure 4: The standard deviation σ of status A against time, for different values of
the parameter p, calculated for the first scenario for N = 75 and averaged over 100
simulations. For time 106, the exponent α (defined by σ2A ∝ tα) is close to one both for
the maximal and minimal σA. The former is related to p between 0.014 and 0.25.
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those for p > pc is visible after some transient time about 104 time steps: the former are
of slightly but clearly higher values. Also, after the transient time t ≈ 105 the exponent
α is about 0.25 for p < pc. Above pc it gradually tends to zero. We conclude that in the
second scenario, the standard deviation of status is a better tool than < x > to detect
the transition.
4. Discussion
After numerous variations of individual status of each agent it is unlikely that two
agents have the same status. Hence after asymptotically long time, v(Aj) is equal to
one for all agents j. Then, the time dependence of < x > in the first scenario can be
interpreted in terms of a simple rule: if −p + 1−pN−1 is negative, < x > decreases, and if
−p + 1−pN−1 is positive, < x > increases. Accordingly, the transition is at p = pc = 1/N .
as observed numerically in Fig. 3. On the other hand, in the second scenario there is no
one common value of p, and that is why the transition is fuzzy there. However, as < A >
remains equal to zero and its distribution is symmetric and homogeneous (v(A) = 1),
the average value of p′ is
< p′ >=
∑
A v(A)p
′(A)∑
A v(A)
= p
∑
A
2
1+2A∑
A 1
= p (3)
and that is why pc = 1/N in both scenarios. On the other hand, the drift of the status
A towards positive or negative values is damped by a reduction or an increase of p′,
according to Eq. (2). That is why the standard deviation of the status distribution is
smaller in the second scenario.
Similar argument allows to interpret the stair-like behaviour of the function < x >
against p, shown in Fig. (2). During the time evolution of the relations, the contribution
of pairs of agents with the same value of status gradually decreases. Yet this contribution
is the same for the values of p between 1/N and 2/N . For N = 75, 2/N = 0.026(6); this
is where the plateau of < x > in Fig. (2) ends.
This part of discussion applies to the model regime after the transient time, when
v(A) is zero or one for most values of A. Then, the coupling between agents is reduced to
interaction in pairs. As we see in Fig. (1) it is only then when the decoupling appears. In
this regime, the model is akin to the Bonabeau model [11]; there, the standard deviation
plays the role of the order parameter. At earlier times, most of the curves < x > (t)
increase even for p > pc, because as long as v > 1, f(i, j) > 0 and the willingness to
praise prevails.
The goal of this paper is to highlight the role of the self-deprecating strategy and of
the accompanying shame-rage spiral. These roles are encoded in Eq. (2). Without the
coupling of the ambition to get high status (encoded in the parameter p) with the status
itself (encoded as A), the transition from the phase ’all relations positive’ to the phase
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’most relations negative’ is sharp and therefore hard to be predicted.
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Figure 5: The mean value of relations < x > against time, for different values of the
parameter p, calculated for the second scenario for N = 75 and averaged over 100 sim-
ulations. As p increases from 0.010 to 0.45, < x > decreases; the dependence is almost
exactly monotonous.
We note that the assumption on the normalization of the term proportional to 1− p
in Eq. (1) by N − 1 is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, it is not clear how our decisions
depend on the number of those who observe us. For instance, the authors of [12, 13]
argue that the influence of neighbours increases with their number less than linearly;
the more neighbours, the smaller contribution of one neighbour. If we remove the above
normalization, the transition remains sharp but it appears at pc = 0.5, independently
on N . Between these two options, intermediate solutions are possible. Another point is
to use the parameter γ instead of 2 in Eq. (2), which could read p′ = 2p/(1 + γA). We
expect that for γ in the range (1,2) the results are intermediate between those obtained
within the two scenarios.
5. Final remarks
The term ’paradox of integration’ has been used recently [14] to describe the phe-
nomenon that immigrants who are better educated and better integrated in the host
society are more sensitive to ethnic discrimination. Hence, they can feel rejected more
often than their less advanced compatriots. Here we intend to add a comment how these
two different but identically termed phenomena interact.
8
 1
 10
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
σ A
t
Figure 6: The standard deviation σ of status A against time, for different values of
the parameter p, calculated for the second scenario for N = 75 and averaged over 100
simulations. At t = 106, σA is the largest for p = 0.010, 0.011, 0.012 and 0.013. Also,
the exponent α (defined by σ2A ∝ tα) is close to 0.25 for these four plots. For higher p,
α decreases monotonously to zero.
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It is useful to refer to the concept of hierarchy of needs by Maslow [15]. We have
to imagine two societies, the host native population (A) and the smaller society of im-
migrants (B). When these groups interact, the elite of B has a lower status than the
elite of A. Hence their need of esteem is not fulfilled, and their use of the self-deprecating
strategy makes no sense. As a consequence, elites of B are treated by their less integrated
compatriots as conceited guys who show disrespect to their tradition and unsuccessfully
crawl to A. This conflict can be more painful than the tension with A on its own.
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